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The breakup of the Communist camp as a result of the Sino-Soviet
dispute in the 1960's has been one of the most striking developments in
our recent history. Lewis Coser has described this breakup as "an event
of world historic importance that may well rank with such crucial turn-
ing points as the break between the Western and Eastern Church, the
Reformation, or the halting of the Islamic onslaught on Western Europe
in the eighth century."'
There is no general agreement among scholars as to the origins of the
dispute. Some trace it back to the early period of the revolutionary
struggle of the 1920's when the Chinese appeared to reject Soviet leader-
ship as well as the Soviet strategy of revolution; others maintain that
the dispute began in secret after the death of Stalin, intensifying during
1956 and 1957, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin and advocated the
peaceful transition to socialism and the policy of "peaceful coexist-
ence," and culminating in a public break in the early 1960's.2
While there may have been disagreement as to the origin of the Sino-
Soviet conflict, the dispute nevertheless is real and involves two primary
sources of conflict: (1) nationalism and the general incompatibility of
the nations' respective national interests and (2) ideology and the gen-
eral disagreement concerning the theory and practice of Marxism-
Leninism. Each of these two issues reflects different historical tradi-
tions, cultural legacies, current world distribution of power, and also
different stages of development of communism in each of these states
and different tactics and experiences in the conduct and achievement of
revolutionary change. As Triska put it so aptly:
The issues between the USSR and Communist China stem from the
facts that while one has had time to develop its economy, the other has
not; one is being satiated, the other is hungry; one has arrived, the
other has barely departed; one is accepted, whereas the other is still
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rejected; one has matured, the other is an upstart; one shows healthy
respect for the present order in the world which it has helped establish,
the other challenges it . .. .
Given these differences in the social, political, miliary, and economic
achievements of the two nations, it is natural to expect that serious,
ideological differences will develop in three areas: (1) organization,
decision-making, and leadership of the world Communist movement,
(2) interfraternal relations within the Communist camp with respect to
the comradery, economic and military assistance, and the degree of
independence and interdependence among the different Communist
party states, and (3) the question of peaceful coexistence and nonpeace-
ful transition to socialism and the role of violence and armed struggle
in the achievement of world revolution.'
In this paper we shall be concerned mainly with the last of these three
doctrinal issues. Our purpose will be to suggest at least a framework for
more ordered thinking on the relationship between law and minimum
world order and social change in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The primary question to be answered is: What can be done to promote
collaborative tendencies between human systems and subsystems of gov-
ernment and to reduce the tendency towards violent competition,
thereby creating the conditions necessary for law to function as a res-
trainer of force in international affairs?
REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS
Before discussing the nature of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, it
is essential to develop a common understanding as to the meaning,
structure, and process of revolutionary ideologies. As used here a revo-
lutionary ideology may be defined as a systematic set of ideas with
action consequences which
define a man's new position in the world (his relation to life, society,
history), the ultimate nature of society, the meaning, the purpose, and
the general order which determine the course of history . . . to trans-
form the world into a way of life that implements itself in a new society
in which every cultural phenomenon is molded in terms of their image
of man and vision of history.5
1J. TRISKA & D. FINLEY, SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 19 (1968).
4See A. GYORGY & G. BLACKWOOD, IDEOLOGIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 126-28 (1967); Scalapino,
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Hence, one of the most important properties of revolutionary ideology
is that it provides the people and organizations that adhere to it a unity
to their ideas.
Ideologies reflect a dichotomous image of the world. The first image
is one of the existential world, usually described in revolutionary terms
as the world of tradition and routine. The second image is of the pro-
jected goal culture, the future world of bliss.' These images make up
what may be called the structure of ideology. They are the doctrinal,
the "pure" manifestations of ideology containing "the conscious syste-
matization to which the ideology aspires."'
Ideologies also contemplate a process and a procedure by which doc-
trinal aspirations are to be attained-the vehicular or transfer culture
by means of which the people may pass from the traditional to the
modern, new order: the future bliss. This is the practical ideology, the
rational instruments for action needed to transform the doctrinal or
pure ideology into action. While pure ideologies and practical ideologies
may be different, they are very closely related. Without pure ideology,
the ideas of practical ideology cannot be legitimated. Without practical
ideology, an organization or a people cannot transform its world view
into consistent action. 8
Hence, the relation between reality and ideology and between struc-
ture and process is dialectical. When the conditions which gave birth to
specific revolutionary ideology are radically changed, the ideology itself
must change or be totally destroyed. Since there is a direct relation
between the structure of an ideology and its process, it follows that a
change in the pure ideology willl lead to a change in the practical ideol-
ogy. Therefore, ideologies bear within them the seeds of their own trans-
formation and negation. "They come into being, develop, change,
achieve and exhaust themselves, decline and die," 9 for once they accom-
plish their goal culture, they lose their reason for existence, and new
symbols and images take their place. This metamorphosis occurs partic-
ularly in the case of ideologies that have modernization and develop-
ment as their goal. These ideologies, once successful, give way to the
more generalized ideology of science and technology which is character-
ized by material abundance, rapid urbanization, educational facilities,
military strength, and a social system that can constantly innovate with-
'Wallace, Revitalization Movements in Development, in THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 448
(R. Ward ed. 1967).
7F. SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 21 (1966).
'ld. at 23.
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out falling apart. Technical and scientific ideologies are evolutionary
and orderly while revolutionary ideologies are not. "In the first, technics
are based on each other, they increase and multiply, and the law of their
change is geometrical. In the second, we always face new beginnings,
through a process of continual flux and through radically changed cir-
cumstances."' 0
Revolutionary ideologies are always accompanied by total conflict
and violence, for revolutions usually seek to create a totally new order,
and their ideology tends to express intense distinctions. Revolutionary
ideology "tries to rearrange socio-cultural phenomena in its own image
of man, society and history, and thereby rejects for its world everything
which does not fit such a vision."" Rapid revolutionary change always
produces tension since the transition may require the replacement of
sacred codes of behavior by secular enlightenment in respect to guidance
in human affairs. 2 In other words, revolutionary change becomes a
process which operates under crisis circumstances; it becomes a type of
warfare, the degree of which is determined by the magnitude of the
change desired and by the speed with which the change is to be effected.
This dynamic phase is followed, however, by the transformation of
revolutionary ideology into tradition. The ideology's functions, pre-
viously served by violence and the use of force, become establishmen-
tarian. Indirect control rather than direct prohibition becomes possi-
ble.' 3 The institutionalization of a system of rewards and deprivations
replaces the direct control promoted by terrorism and violence. In other
words, coercion and the threat and use of force decline as cooperation
among the participants in the new order increases.
It is in this context that we are now able to understand the differences
between the Chinese and Russians on the issues of war and peace, as
these differences seem to reflect different stages of their respective revo-
lutionary accomplishments.
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE OVER WAR AND PEACE ISSUES
In little over half a century since its uneasy beginning, the Soviet
Union has developed into one of the great world powers. Its military
strength, economic power, political suasion, and its level of technologi-
cal achievement reflect the phenomenal achievements of its revolution.
'OId.
"Id.
"See generally Spengler, Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values, and Politico-Economic
Development, in TRADITION, VALUES AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 1, 3 (J. Spengler &
R. Braibanti eds. 1961).
"I. HOROWITZ, THREE WORLDS OF DEVELOPMENT 449 (1966).
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Yet, having achieved this height of power and status, its revolutionary
zeal has mellowed and moderated. A semblance of a balance between
aspirations and achievement, between mobilization and institution-
alization, has been reached, both at the national and international levels.
The system has reached a takeoff-point, and a new attitude towards
government, politics, law, and order has emerged. Politically and sociol-
ogically there has emerged a new style of Soviet behavior, a concern
with maturity in human affairs. The Soviet Union has moved from "the
adulation and adoration of the Stalin era, to the capricious and even
boorish qualities of the Krushchev era[;] the new Soviet technical elite
has had to wince, grin, and bear it. But with the Brezhnev-Kosygin
regime, the term 'businesslike' has become the byword in Soviet politi-
cal behavior."'" Or as described by Triska:
Conditions inside the Soviet Union have moderated Soviet attitudes
abroad. Concepts of friend and foe, war and peace, victory and defeat
have acquired new meanings. The Soviet Union now plays a vital part
in a world balance of power which it helped establish and which it
respects in its own way as much as its bourgeois partners do, even if
that means the recognition of neutralism and neutrals (including Com-
munist neutralism in Yugoslavia). The USSR has traveled a long way
since 1917, is proud of its journey, and in many ways announces that
it has "arrived". It is a powerful "have-nation", conscious that it has
vested a great deal of its capital in what it has achieved in contrast to
what it may achieve. It is unlikely today to take willingly any major
risk which will endanger its present position in the world.' 5
Communist China in contrast to the U.S.S.R. is still in the primitive
stage of accumulation, comparable to that of Russia in the 1920's, with
a strong puritanical spirit and messianic features which marked the
early years of the Bolshevik Revolutionaries. It is a have-not nation, not
yet recognized by the world's greatest power or by the world com-
munity. Because it is a young nation, its leaders lack confidence and
experience in the modern world setting. It is nevertheless impatient,
revolutionary, and competitive; it is a nation with great potential and
an awareness of its future role in the world.' 6
Unlike Russia, China can claim a rich past, though humiliated and
destroyed by a series of wars perpetrated by the West. The impact of
this tradition and its destruction is of singular importance to under-
standing China's history and its current ideological bent. It created
"lid. at 156.
11J. TRISKA & D. FINLEY, supra note 3, at 18.
1L. COSER, supra note I, at 234-35.
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Chinese nationalism out of Confucian culturalism. It ... instilled in
a proud and once powerful people the determination to end their coun-
try's status as a semi-colony and to achieve its recognition as a sover-
eign equal. The Chinese Communists drove to power by capturing this
nationalist sentiment. 7
Hence, China's unique Maoist ideology is not only peculiarly adapted
to China's needs as a developing nation,
it is also in tune with the ideological needs of many members of the
intellegentsia in the underdeveloped countries. It can hence serve the
Chinese penetration of the world Communist movement, especially in
the underdeveloped nations. 18
These differences in levels of development and historical experience
explain the different stand that each of these two giant Communist
nations takes with respect to the use of force in the achievement of world
revolutions and the support of national revolutionary movements. Un-
happy with the Soviet line of peaceful transition to socialism, the
Chinese in 1957 insisted that the use of violence is the only way to
achieve the ultimate goal.
The bourgeoisie will not step down from the stage of history volun-
tarily. This is a universal law of class struggle. In no country should
the proletariat and the Communist Party slacken their preparations
for the revolution in any way. They must be prepared at all times to
repulse counter-revolutionary attacks and, at the critical juncture of
the revolution when the working class is seizing state power, to over-
throw the bourgeoisie by armed force if it uses armed force to suppress
the people's revolution (generally speaking, it is inevitable that the
bourgeoisie will do so).
In the present situation of the international Communist movement,
it is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire
for peaceful transition. But it would be inappropriate to over-
emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition. 9
By 1965 the issues of peace and war were more sharply defined. Lin
Piao, the Minister of National Defense, stated the argument against
peaceful transition and the Russian policy of peaceful coexistence in
"
7Cohen, Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law-and Our Own, 1967 A.S.I.L.
PROCEEDINGS 108, 110.
1L. COSER, supra note 1, at 234.
"Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) and Honggi (Red Flag), The Origin
and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Our-
selves- Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU 58-62 (1963),
reprinted in SOURCES IN MODERN EAST ASIAN HISTORY AND POLITICS, supra note 2, at 301-02.
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detail.2 0 He charged the Russians with betraying the revolutionary peo-
ples. In differentiating between the Russian and the Chinese revolutions,
he stressed their distinguishing characteristics. Although both revolu-
tions were led by the working class with Marxist-Leninist parties as the
nucleus, the Russian revolution took place in imperialist Russia, while
the Chinese revolution broke out in semicolonial, semifeudal China. The
October Revolution was an urban revolution, while the Chinese revolu-
tion was a rural one where the Communists won nationwide victory
through the conquest of the hinterland and the ultimate encirclement of
the cities. This rich experience of China, it is argued, should become the
model for all the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. To quote
Lin Piao:
It must be emphasized that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the
establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement
of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal prac-
tical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all the op-
pressed nations and peoples, and particularly for the revolutionary
struggles of all oppressed nations and peoples of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys.2
This view is representative of Chinese Communist thought that world
revolution must be organized first in the poor, rural nations of the world
and from there proceed to victory over the rich countries. Under such
circumstances, Latin America, Africa, and Asia are considered the test-
ing ground. Again quoting Lin Piao:
Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can
be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin Amer-
ica constitute "the rural areas of the world." Since World War II, the
proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been tem-
porarily held back in the North American and West European capital-
ist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Af-
rica and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the
contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encircle-
ment of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause
of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian,
African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming
majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should re-
gard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolution-
ary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America.2 2
"Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of the People's War, 8 PEKING REV., Sept. 3, 1965, at 24,
reprinted in SOURCES IN MODERN EAST ASIAN HISTORY AND POLITICS, supra note 2, at 309.
21d.
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It is in this area of support to wars of national liberation movements
that the Russians and the Chinese seem to have most disagreement. The
Chinese consider the Russians to be revisionists, because preaching
peaceful coexistence has the effect of diverting the "oppressed nations
from their struggle against imperialism and [sabotaging] their national-
democratic revolution, all in the service of imperialism. '2 3
As a result, the Chinese see themselves as the major revolutionary
force in the world. As the greatest of the world's underdeveloped coun-
tries and the first to have undergone a total social revolution, they see
themselves as carrying the burden for world revolution. Their world
view today is marked by the struggle of socialism against imperialism.
The central value of their ideology is the notion of struggle.25 Hence,
peaceful coexistence and peaceful settlement of disputes are impossible,
and conflict and the use of force are inevitable.
CHINA AND THE LEGAL CONTROL OF FORCE
The question to be asked at this point is how should we approach this
contradiction between China's outlook on the use of force and the need
to maintain a minimum world order?
One way of resolving this question is to describe Chinese behavior as
uncivilized and contrary to the prescriptions of international law. To
support this argument, selected principles of the United Nations
Charter may be invoked. Of particular application are those provisions
that require states to refrain from the use or threat of force, except in
individual or collective self-defense against armed attack, 5 and to settle
their disputes by peaceful means.2" The provisions of the Charter pro-
vide a clear indication that "[w]ar, in the sense of equality of the bellig-
erents and application of the law of neutrality equally to both, seems
-on principle to be outlawed. ' 27
Further evidence that China's behavior is unlawful is the Kellogg-
Briand Pact,28 which outlaws aggressive wars and which renunciates war
as an instrument of foreign policy. It calls upon states to settle their
21d.
'IF. SCHURMANN, supra note 7, at 39.
"See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 and art. 51. For a good discussion of the operation of Article
2(4), see Franck, Who Killed Article 2 (4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by
States, 64 A.J.I.L. 809 (1970).
ZU.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
"1See Wright, International Law and the American Civil War, 1967 A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGs 50,
56.
"Treaty with Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of Interna-
tional Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796.
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"disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may
be,""9 by peaceful means. Additional arguments to condemn China's
behavior may be based upon the principles incorporated into the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal'" or the 1954 Draft Code of the
International Law Commission of Offences Against the Pace and Se-
curity of Mankind,"
The sad truth is, however, that the legal approach has not proved
effective and in fact may have complicated the issue and potentially
increased the possibility of conflict and the use of violence. It has em-
phasized formalism and a legal apparatus which separates the legal
from the political, social, economic, and historical elements of world
society. Priority has been given the lawyer, as if to say that law has a
life of its own. Such an artificial separation of law from its source
(society) may result in a procedure by which the legal structure is exam-
ined to the partial or even total exclusion of social dynamics. While
there may be an element of safety in the use of the traditional and the
enduring, it is doubtful that an approach that seeks order will lead
necessarily to a decision which serves justice. The principles and proce-
dures of law must be measured by the degree of their correlation to
objective circumstances. A heedless sacrifice of reality will not enable
the law to restrain the use of force. On the contrary, instead of produc-
"ld.; see Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 A.J.I.L. 39 (1933).
IOSee CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 82 U.N.T.S.
284, 286. For a detailed discussion of the meaning and application of the Charter, see I. BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 167-213 (1963).
3 The Draft code listed offenses related to the issues of aggression which may be summarized
as follows:
I. Acts of aggression, including the use of armed force for purposes other than
national or collective self-defense.
2. A threat by the authorities of one state to resort to aggression against another state.
3. Preparation for the use of armed force against another state for purposes other
than national or collective self-defense.
4. The organization, encouragement, or toleration of armed bands operating against
another state.
5. Undertaking or fomenting civil strife in another state.
6. The undertaking or encouragement of terrorist activities in another state.
7. Violations of the obligations of treaties restricting or limiting armaments, military
training, fortifications, and so on.
8. The annexation of territory belonging to another state or of territory under an
international regime by means contrary to international law.
9. Intervention in the internal or external affairs of another state by means of eco-
nomic or political coercion in order to obtain advantages of any kind.
International Law Commission, Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, art. 2, Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 9, II, U.N. Doc. A/2693
(1955).
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ing a world ruled by law, law becomes a rationalization for the party
that happens to utilize the greatest amount of violence at a given time.
The second consideration respecting a strictly legal approach is that
it may lead to a simplifed acceptance of Chinese rhetorical statements
as authentic policy without taking into account the context or reasons
for these statements. Professor Jerome Cohen described such a possibil-
ity very eloquently.
[SIcholars are superfluous if their only task is to do a scissors and paste
job on current Chinese statements, for clipping services and propa-
ganda organizations bombard us with reminders of Peking's recent
hostility. Scholarship, after all, should tell us how the past became the
present and why. Otherwise we may mistake [China's] present atti-
tudes as eternally fixed and be deterred from attempting to encourage
moderation of those attitudes.12
Third, the legal approach may make it difficult for international
lawyers to make legal judgments on the issue and to substitute an adju-
dicatory for an adversary orientation. Hence, Chinese behavior and the
use of force by China might be construed as unique and inherent in
Chinese mentality and ideology. One might also forget that China's
policy on the use or threat of force and its support of national liberation
movements and armed struggle are also accepted as legitimate behavior
by other powers and enjoy a recent tradition in the West as well. One
has to recall the role and status of governments in exile during World
War II. The heroic imagery used to describe anti-Nazi terrorism and
freedom resistance movements should be fresh in our minds. More
recent examples are incidents of anti-Communist terrorism; counter-
insurgency operations by the Western powers and especially the support
the United States gave to the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guate-
mala; and United States support and training provided the anti-Castro
exiles who proposed to liberate their country by violent means and failed
in the Bay of Pigs fiasco.33
Fourth, a purely legalistic approach to the understanding of Chinese
behavior would tend to favor incumbent regimes and the incumbent
order without regard to the justiciable or non-justiciable nature of these
regimes.34 The stress on the identification of legitimacy, and thereby the
right of self-defense of incumbent governments which themselves may
3 2Cohen, supra note 17, at 112-13.
"Barnet, United States Involvement in Foreign Civil Strife Since World War 1!, 1967 A.S.I.L.
PROCEEDINGS 69 Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 A.J.1. L. 415,
423-24 (1969).
31. BROWNLIE, supra note 30, at 420-21.
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have acquired their legitimacy by force of arms," tends to rigidify the
law and obstruct peaceful change. Law becomes a source of rigidity and
instability."
Finally, perhaps the most important shortcoming of the legal ap-
proach to war-peace issues is its insistence that the possibility of conflict
and violence is outside the world social system and, therefore, that
conflicts are necessarily destructive of world order. The legal approach
places a definite premium on social equilibrium at the expense of social
change and without regard for social equality. This approach, further-
more, tends to become a metaphysical representation of the dominant
ideological matrix to which a nation must conform if it is to avoid the
onus of being considered a deviant or an unconnected isolationist. 7
Such an approach, as applied to China, would deny it the right to
deviate from the established order, even though that order may not be
responsive to its legitimate interests and even though China may have
been deprived of the choice concerning the conditions and direction of
its past or future. To obey the dominant ideological matrix may mean,
in the case of China, to accept the status of the dominated have-not
nation. Should China attempt to change the established order, other
than in conformity with the interests of governments in control, China
will likely be considered an aggressor.
It follows that the approach which overemphasizes legalism, and thus
insulates the law from social context and social dynamics, cannot claim
validity. Such an approach can neither eliminate nor reduce the inci-
dence of violence. Neither can it explain the reasons for the use of vio-
lence and the relationships among law, violence, and social change.
The possibility of adopting valid norms to restrain the use of force
presupposes a minimal degree of compatibility between the law and its
social context.3 The impositions of such norms upon the dominated
does not of itself endow the norms with validity. Legality of a norm and
its legitimacy are by no means synonymous. 9 Procedural and struc-
tural aspects of a legal norm may have a broad consensus of values;
however, the substantive norms of social and political relationship-the
"
5See Falk, The International Regulation of Internal Violence in the Developing Countries, 1966
A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS 58-59; Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 185, 240-48 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964).
3
6
L. PYE, ASPECTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 190-212 (1966).
37See T. PARSONS, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND MODERN SOCIETY 466-89 (1967); Horowitz,
Consensus. Conflict, and Cooperation, in SYSTEM, CHANGE, AND CONFLICT 265-79 (N. Demerath
& R. Peterson eds. 1967).
'See Jaguaribe, World Order, Rationality, and Socio Economic Development, in CONDITIONS
OF WORLD ORDER 208 (S. Hoffman ed. 1968).
11H. NIEBURG, POLITICAL VIOLENCE: THE BEHAVIORAL PROCESS 54 (1967).
1972]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
matter of rights, duties, obligations-carry no such agreements. They
are the common grist of international politics." Legality is an attribute
of sovereignty; it is an abstraction which confers the authority of the
state on those who act on its behalf, and on their actions, as well as on
the code of law which regulates behavior. In this context, "[flegality is
the technicality of formal consistency and adequate authority."'"
Legitimacy reflects the vitality of the underlying consensus which
endows the world system of law and those responsible for its operation
with whatever authority and power that they possess. This endowment
of authority operates not by virtue of legality, but by the reality of the
respect that the participants in the world political system pay to the
institutions and behavioral norms of that system. Legitimacy is there-
fore earned by those whose management of the power of the world
system represents and reflects community interests and concerns. 2
Legitimacy cannot be claimed or granted by a mere technicality of
the law. It can be secured only by the operation of a world order that
cultivates and meets old and new expectations, mediates conflicting
claims and interests, and aids the process by which the values of the
individual actors are allocated in the enactment, enforcement, and ob-
servance of law. In this sense, not all laws are legitimate, although they
may be considered legal. "Laws that were once legitimate may still
retain legality after losing legitimacy. '4 3 In the absence of legitimacy,
the orderly enforcement of norms, otherwise legal, will be impossible,
because their observance depends entirely upon coercion by the domi-
nant group.
A valid juridical order (that is, a legitimate order) must therefore be
"founded on appropriate institutional developments and grow out of a
degree of compatibility among the leading interests."44 Compatibility of
interest must be measured in terms of the compatibility between the
capacity for values and resources to be allocated within the world politi-
cal system and the claims made by the actors to the resources of the
system. Since there is never complete concordance among actors within
the system on the nature or measure of resources and values to be
allocated, conflict and even violence may ensue. Those with established
interests will consider any challenge to their interests an attack on the
system itself. The frustrated participants who attempt to increase their
40Jd.
41Id.
4 See Jaguaribe, supra note 38, at 209.
1
3H. NIEBURG, supra note 39, at 54.
"
4Jaguaribe, supra note 38, at 209.
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share of gratification will encounter resistance from the incumbent,
dominant interests. This process has been described by Lewis Coser:
Levels of aspiration as well as feelings of deprivation are relative to.
institutionalized expectations and are established through comparison.
When social systems have institutionalized goals and values to govern
the conduct of component actors, but limit access to these goals for
certain members of the society, "departures from institutional require-
ments" are to be expected. Similarly, if certain groups within a social
system compare their share in power, wealth, and status honor with
that of other groups and question the legitimacy of this distribution,
discontent is likely to ensue. If there exist no institutionalized provi-
sions for the expression of such discontents, departures from what is
required by the norms of the social system may occur. 5
The departure from the established norms may be either minor or
drastic, depending on the gap between aspirations of the frustrated
group and the level of achievement that the dominant system will allow.
Since the output of any social system consists of rewards and depriva-
tions in relation to resource allocation, it is possible to measure the level
of frustration in terms of the degree of alternation between the rewards
and the deprivation that the system will allow. The greater that degree
of alternation, the more valid the system becomes, as a semblance of
equality is achieved. As the system becomes responsive to the consti-
tuency, the need for coercion is minimized. If, on the other hand, the
system of rewards and deprivation is discriminatory, and any group
within the system is consistently deprived with no hope of receiving
substantive rewards, the legitimacy and validity of the system may be
seriously questioned, and the need to use force or the threat of it often
becomes a necessity.
The great English liberal John Morley once said:
If [the men who are most attached to the reigning order of things]
had a larger faith in the stability for which they profess so great an
anxiety, they would be more free alike in understanding and temper
to deal generously, honestly and effectively with those whom they
count imprudent innovators. 7
Those nations most vocal in support of the existing juridical order and
who "profess so great an anxiety" for the maintenance of a rule of law
and the legal constraint of force have not been "more free alike in
understanding and temper" and have not attempted to deal generously
11L. COSER, supra note 1, at 31.
"See I. HOROWITZ, supra note 13, at 434-35.
'J. MORLEY, ON COMPROMISE 263-64 (1917), quoted in L. COSER, supra note I, at 35.
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or honestly with a China whom they count as an imprudent innovator
endangering world peace. The United States, one of the most important
leaders in this reigning juridical order, is yet to give recognition to this
giant of nations which represents one-fourth of the world's population.
And yet recognition is an ultimate measure of understanding, because
it is the one act in international law which legitimizes existence and
which helps integrate nations into the world juridical order.
The United Nations, the representative of the world community and
the defender of the Charter which outlaws the use of force in the settle-
ments of disputes and whose main function is the maintenance of peace,
has not yet made peace with China. Yet nonrecognition and denial of
membership in the United Nations have serious implications for China's
outlook on world order. Commenting on the question of Chinese partic-
ipation in the world organization, Myres McDougal and Richard Good-
man have said:
Any decision on the Chinese participation question will have ex-
traordinary value impacts. Immense power is at stake. A participation
decision will determine whether and how one quarter of the world's
population will share in world community processes of authority, and
it will affect the resource-base-material, institutional, and stra-
tegic-of international organizations. It will influence the range and
type of decisions which world organizations can make in implementing
and clarifying the common interest ...
Immense power is at stake even outside the institutions of the
United Nations. A permanent Security Council seat is a symbol of
Great-Power status, with trappings of legitimacy, authority and con-
trol over extensive resources. A transfer of the seat, with its attendant
symbols, could work important changes in the world power configura-
tion. Some Western countries, and certainly many non-aligned coun-
tries, might revise their economic, military and political alliances.
Southeast Asian political leaders would certainly face disturbing policy
choices. Communist governments and parties may reorient themselves
in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Power, further, is not the only value at stake. A transfer of China's
United Nations seats could affect the advancement of human rights,
the development of international law, the distribution of wealth by
international agencies, the allocation of capital between the developed
and lesser developed countries, the evolution of labor standards, and
the dissemination of knowledge bearing on health, meteorology, food
production and peaceful uses of atomic energy. 8
"
8 McDougal & Goodman, Chinese Participation in the United Nations: The Legal Imperative
of a Negotiated Solution, 60 A.J.I.L. 671, 672 (1966); cf. Chiu & Edwards, Communist China's
Attitude Toward the United Nations: A Legal Analysis, 62 A.J.1.L. 20, 45-49 (1968).
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Ironically, these statements by two leading international lawyers were
given as reasons for not admitting China to the United Nations except
on terms which the Chinese deem imcompatible with national self-
respect.
Is it any wonder that the Chinese leaders maintain a strong sense of
outrage and cynicism towards the existing world juridical order? It is
this sense of outrage over the deprivations they are suffering which leads
them to encourage and condone the use of violence as a means of
changing the world order in an effort to making it more responsive and
just. In this quest they have natural allies among nations of the Third
World. Legal superstructures must evolve as a consequence of develop-
ment and modernization. Otherwise, legal restraints such as those pro-
vided by the Charter and interpreted and applied by the dominant actors
on the world scene, which now include the Soviets, may well require the
abandonment of the revolutionary impulse toward development and
modernization, and thus a more equitable distribution of world re-
sources which is a prerequisite for the achievement of a valid juridical
order. Illustrative of the relationship between socio-economic develop-
ment and peaceful accommodation is the Soviet experience and change
in attitude towards international law and peaceful coexistence. 9
CONCLUSION
Ideology may have unified Chinese goals and aspirations, but ideol-
ogy did not create them. They are an element of China's awareness of
its own condition. While Chinese Communism may be accidental,
China's aspirations and frustrations are real and natural. They are part
of a worldwide historical movement of the new nationalism and the
revolution of rising expectations. It will be dangerous and self-defeating
to ascribe Chinese behavior to an evil ideology, or to a power hungry
violent man, or to the result of isolated conspiracies or plots. Many
other millions in the Third World who are not Communists share this
same outlook. The only difference is that they may be either too weak
or unwilling to do much about it. China is both willing and capable of
acting to change its lot in the world community. Its use of violence
against an unresponsive world represents China's struggle toward social
reintegration and legitimacy. That struggle enables China to test the
"For a comparative discussion of Soviet and Chinese views on international law consult the
following: Chiu, Communist China's Attitude Toward International Law, 60 A.J.I.L. 245 (1966);
Chiu, Certain Legal Aspects of Communist China's Treaty Practice, 1967 A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS
117; Johnston, Treaty Analysisand Community China: Preliminary Observations, 1967 A.S.I.L.
PROCEEDINGS 126.
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political legitimacy of the existing world order and to influence the
process of bargaining and adjustment with its adversaries.
Recognition of the relevance of violence in the process of change does
not condone it or encourage it. The incidence of violence should be
"looked upon as society's early warning system, revealing deep-rooted
political conflicts which are gathering strength beneath the surface of
social relations." 50 Accommodating the deep conflicts may lead to mod-
eration and cooperation. Neglecting them, and insulating the status quo
against timely and responsive change, may increase the incidence of
violence and make formal legal restraints irrelevant, and even unjust.
soH. NIEBURG, supra note 39, at 7.
